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Abstract
Over the past years, the European Court of  Human Rights has significantly developed 
and strengthened its Article 14 non-discrimination jurisprudence, including in a number 
of  ground-breaking international law cases establishing increased state responsibility 
with regard to ethnic segregation in education and gender violence. However, in the type 
of  cases that constitute a large part of  its non-discrimination case load, namely physical 
violence against racial minorities, the Court has so far failed to adequately address Article 
14 discrimination claims raised by the victims. We posit that this could be caused in part 
by what we call the ‘Holocaust Prism’. Put briefly, the experience of  the Holocaust has 
shaped the manner in which continental European courts understand racism and race 
discrimination, at least (or especially) when it is combined with violence. Paradoxically, 
this entails that in the most heinous cases of  race discrimination, the discrimination 
threshold is raised to the level of  criminal conduct. Moreover, to the extent that it is, only 
the ethnic dimension of  such discrimination is foregrounded even in cases that present 
obvious intersectional (for example, ethnicity plus gender) dimensions. We exemplify 
this phenomenon by discussing recent case law on forced sterilization of  Roma women 
and argue that the Court should become aware of  this issue, recognize intersectional 
discrimination and align its case law on racist violence with the discrimination doctrine 
emerging in its gender violence and educational race segregation cases, both for the sake 
of  internal consistency and to better capture the structural nature of  racial discrimina-
tion in Europe.
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1 Introduction
At first glance, Europe seems to be strongly committed to the fight against race dis-
crimination. The equality provisions of  most national constitutions include race 
and/or ethnicity as a prohibited ground of  discrimination or unequal treatment, and 
national criminal law aggravates crimes, or creates entirely new crimes, if  committed 
with a racist motive. With the Council Directive (EC) 2000/43 (Race Directive),1 the 
European Union (EU) has ensured that, throughout its member states, race discrimi-
nation is prohibited in many areas, from employment law to the provision of  services, 
when not only state actors but also private individuals are involved. Moreover, in con-
trast to the situation in the USA, racist speech can be limited more extensively.
Many of  these measures are inextricably linked to the Nazi Holocaust and how it has 
shaped Europe’s understanding of  racism and race/ethnic discrimination.2 National 
constitutions with strong bills of  rights containing equality provisions were adopted in 
the wake of  World War II. The Race Directive was adopted surprisingly quickly, arguably 
as a reaction to Jörg Haider, a populist politician with a Nazi pedigree, becoming part of  
the government in Austria.3 Moreover, the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR), 
which interprets the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), has been able to 
limit freedom of  speech, possibly because such limitations have been useful for the vali-
dation of  laws prohibiting Holocaust denial or the spreading of  Nazi ideology.
At the same time, this underlying influence of  the Holocaust on our understand-
ing of  what constitutes race discrimination, and how it is paradigmatically expressed, 
has also made it difficult to recognize and name race, racism, and race discrimina-
tion in mainland Europe’s context outside the parameters of  the (neo-)Nazi sphere. 
When evoked in a particular instance, the inherent accusation is so strong and sym-
bolically laden as to make it prohibitive, provoking immediate and total rejection. One 
can interpret France’s resistance to the introduction of  ethnic statistics in this way, 
partially justifying it on the grounds that France only collected its citizens’ race and 
ethnicity during the Vichy regime when it served the aim of  deporting mainly Jews 
to extermination camps.4 Similar are the proposals to eliminate the word ‘race’ from 
1 Council Directive (EC) 2000/43 implementing the principle of  equal treatment between persons irre-
spective of  racial or ethnic origin (Race Directive), [2000] OJ L180/22.
2 While decolonization certainly played a role in developing such a framework, we hold that at least in the 
mainland European context – and, therefore, for most judges at the European Court of  Human Rights 
(ECtHR) – the Holocaust has shaped the vision of  what racism and race discrimination mean. See also 
French Criminal Code of  1994 in its current version, available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCo-
deArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006419417&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719 (last visited 27 
October 2015), where Art. R131-35 establishes the accessory sanction of  citizenship education training. 
A person convicted with the aggravating circumstance of  racism must attend such training includes a 
reminder of  the existence of  crimes against humanity and especially those committed during the Second 
World War. Racism is thus equivalent to anti-Semitism and not to colonialism or other forms of  racism. 
Similarly, on German exceptionalism, see Barskanmaz, ‘Rasse: Unwort des Antidiskriminierungsrechts?’, 
44 Kritische Justiz (2011) 382.
3 See M. Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (2002), at 74.
4 See Simon, ‘Sciences sociales et racisme: où sont les docteurs Folamour?’, 3 Mouvements (1999) 111; 
Mucchielli, ‘Il n’y a pas de statistique raciste, seulement des interprétations’, 3 Mouvements (1999) 115.
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the French and German constitutions and legislation5 because it harkens back to an 
uncomfortable past and is not a scientifically sound concept. Even the ECtHR is not 
immune to the legacies of  the Holocaust and the ways in which it silences everyday 
racism. The second part of  this article demonstrates the general progressive evolution 
in the Court’s approach to Article 14 of  the ECHR with a doctrine that holds great 
potential for the treatment of  forms of  both racial and gender discrimination, which, 
interestingly, has not been extended to the treatment of  cases dealing with racist vio-
lence (set out in the third part of  the article). The fourth part will introduce the influ-
ence of  the Holocaust as an explanation for this discrepancy as well as for the single 
focus on race (as opposed to gender) in intersectional cases of  violence that reproduce 
the practices of  the Holocaust. It will exemplify this sustained hypothesis using case 
law on the forced sterilization of  Roma women.
2 The New Frontiers of  Article 14’s Anti-Discrimination 
Doctrine: Educational Race Segregation and Gender 
Violence as Discrimination
The history of  Article 14 and non-discrimination has been a troubled one in the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence. It has been argued frequently that one of  the main obstacles 
for fully-fledged Article 14 claims was that they could only be brought in conjunc-
tion with the violation of  other ECHR rights (the ambit criterion), making Article 14 
a ‘parasitic’ provision.6 However, the Court has developed increasingly strong non-
discrimination jurisprudence – for example, by easing up on the accessory character 
of  Article 14, by interpreting the ambit criterion quite broadly and by declaring the list 
of  grounds contained in Article 14 as being illustrative and not exhaustive.7
Most importantly, the ECtHR has increasingly moved from a formal equality concep-
tion to a more substantive understanding of  equality in its case law, accepting claims 
5 See, e.g., the bill of  law for France proposing to eliminate the word ‘race’ from French legislation: 
Proposition de loi tendant à la suppression du mot ‘race’ de notre législation, No. 218, XIVe Législature 
(16 May 2013), available at www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0139.asp (last visited 27 October 
2015). For Germany, see, e.g., the policy papers by Cremer: ‘[U]nd welcher Rasse gehören Sie an?’ Zur 
Problematik des Begriffs ‘Rasse’ in der Gesetzgebung, Working Paper Series: Deutsches Institut für 
Menschenrechte, vol. 10 (2009); Ein Grundgesetz ohne ‘Rasse’: Vorschlag für eine Änderung des Artikels 
3 Grundgesetz, Policy Paper Series: Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, vol. 16 (2010).
6 See D.J. Harris, M. Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of  the European Convention on Human Rights (1995), at 463. 
Protocol 12 established Article 14 as a self-standing right. Protocol 12 to the ECHR 2000, ETS 177, avail-
able at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=177&CL=ENG (last visited 
27 October 2015).
7 On various elements of  this evolution, see, e.g., Wintemute, ‘“Within the Ambit”: How Big Is the “Gap” 
in Article 14 European Convention on Human Rights’, European Human Rights Law Review (2004) 366; 
O’Connell, ‘Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art. 14 and the Right to Non-Discrimination in the ECHR’, 
29 Legal Studies (2009) 211; Danisi, ‘How Far Can the European Court of  Human Rights Go in the 
Fight against Discrimination? Defining New Standards in Its Non-Discrimination Jurisprudence’, 9 
International Journal of  Constitutional Law (2011) 793; Besson, ‘Evolutions in Non-Discrimination Law 
within the ECHR and ESC Systems: It Takes Two to Tango in the Council of  Europe’, 60 American Journal 
of  Comparative Law (2012) 147.
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of  reasonable accommodation and indirect discrimination.8 From the start, the Court 
has focused on whether the different treatment of  otherwise similar situations has had 
an objective or reasonable justification, exploring whether there was a legitimate aim 
and a reasonable relationship of  proportionality between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realized. In this aim, contracting states were granted a certain mar-
gin of  appreciation in assessing whether, and to what extent, differences in otherwise 
similar situations justified a different treatment in law.9 More recently, the Court has 
explicitly endorsed a substantive interpretation of  the anti-discrimination provision, 
placing the emphasis on ensuring the effective enjoyment of  rights by acknowledging 
that discrimination can consist also of  treating different situations similarly, so that 
in order not to violate Article 14 a special accommodation may in fact be required.10 
Furthermore, the Court has recognized that an Article 14 violation may arise from a 
de facto discrimination (that is, the way a law was applied), as opposed to a de jure dis-
crimination, wherein the laws or regulations directly discriminate,11 and that general 
policies or measures that have disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular 
group may be considered discriminatory notwithstanding that they are not specifi-
cally aimed at that group.12
For our purposes, the expansive evolution on the applicable burden of  proof  in dis-
crimination cases is also of  equal importance in view of  the difficulties an applicant 
may have in showing discrimination.13 Acknowledging such difficulties, the idea of  
sharing or shifting the burden of  proof  has gradually become accepted in national 
and international law and practice, with the ECtHR following the lead of  the European 
Court of  Justice and the European directives.14 The ECtHR has also increasingly, albeit 
inconsistently, moved towards this analytical framework, with adaptations depend-
ing on whether the case before it concerned direct discrimination, indirect discrimi-
nation and/or reasonable accommodation. Even though the Court does not always 
respect this order of  analysis, the applicant, in general, has had to present a prima facie 
case of  discrimination, which mainly entails showing (i) a different or similar treat-
ment; (ii) the grounds of  discrimination and (iii) the comparability of  situations. At 
this point, the burden shifts to the state, which has needed to justify the measures and 
demonstrate that reasons other than discrimination were/are at work.15 In addition, 
8 See O.M. Arnardottir, Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2002).
9 See, e.g., Inze v. Austria, Appl. no. 8695/79, Judgment of  28 October 1987, at 41; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 
Appl. no. 17371/90, Judgment of  16 September 1996, para. 42.
10 The leading case is Thlimmenos v. Greece, Appl. no. 34369/97, Judgment of  6 April 2000.
11 See Zarb Adami v. Malta, Appl. no. 17209/02, Judgment of  20 June 2006, at 49.
12 See, e.g., Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 24746/94, Judgment of  4 May 2001, para. 154. 
See also the discussion of  Roma education segregation cases later in this article.
13 Arnardottir, ‘Non-Discrimination under Article 14 ECHR: The Burden of  Proof ’, 51 Scandinavian Studies 
in Law (2007) 13.
14 See, e.g., at the European Union (EU) level, Council Directive (EC) 97/80 on the burden of  proof  in cases 
of  discrimination based on sex [1998] OJ L14/6; Race Directive, supra note 1, Art. 8, which has intro-
duced the shifting of  burden of  proof  to the defendant once the plaintiff  has shown a prima facie case.
15 See, e.g., Chassagnou and Others v. France, Appl. nos 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, Judgment of  
29 April 1999, paras 91–92.
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the Court has established that in certain circumstances, where the events at issue lie 
wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of  the authorities, it falls to 
the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation.16 Finally, with 
regard to the type of  information needed to establish a prima facie case of  discrimina-
tion, the Court has become much more flexible by recognizing that statistics, among 
other things, can be sufficient to shift the burden of  proof  to the respondent states.17 
This jurisprudential evolution has had a clear impact on the conceptualization of  edu-
cational racial segregation and gender violence as forms of  discrimination.
A Race Discrimination in Education Segregation Cases
The ECtHR explicitly dealt with an indirect discrimination claim for the first time in 
D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic (Ostrava case), finding a violation of  Article 14 and 
heavily relying on the fact that statistics could be used to establish a prima facie case 
of  indirect discrimination.18 The applicants from Ostrava argued that there existed de 
facto a segregated school system because the probability of  a Roma child being trans-
ferred to a special school for children with mental deficiencies was 27 times higher 
than for non-Roma children. According to the applicants, this constituted a viola-
tion of  Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 2 of  Protocol 1 on the right to 
education. With one judge dissenting, the Second Chamber held that no Convention 
right had been violated, as it did not find the statistics indicative of  racial prejudice 
in the placement of  Roma children into special schools, especially considering that 
the schools also offered support services to some non-Roma children.19 The Grand 
Chamber, however, reversed the decision in what has today become one of  the Court’s 
best-known cases.
Reflecting evolving European anti-discrimination law standards, the ECtHR con-
sidered that racial and ethnic discriminations are particularly invidious kinds of  dis-
crimination requiring special vigilance and a vigorous reaction from the authorities 
so that no difference in treatment, based either exclusively or to a decisive extent on a 
person’s ethnic origin, is allowed to be objectively justified.20 The Court recalled that 
discrimination can also occur when a general policy or measure has disproportion-
ately prejudicial effects on a particular group, notwithstanding the fact that it is not 
specifically aimed at that group. With respect to the burden of  proof, the judges held 
that once the applicant has been able to demonstrate a difference in treatment, the 
burden falls to the government to show that such treatment was justified. Finally, 
the judges stressed the fact that Roma/Gypsies are a particularly vulnerable group, 
which means that special consideration should be given to their needs and different 
lifestyle.21
16 See, e.g., Salman v. Turkey, Appl. no. 21986/93, Judgment of  27 June 2000, para. 100.
17 See Hoogendijk v.  the Netherlands (dec.), Appl. no.  58641/00, Judgment of  6 January 2005; D.H.  and 
Others v. Czech Republic, Appl. no. 57325/00, Judgment of  13 November 2007.
18 Ibid. D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, Appl. no. 57325/00, Judgment of  7 February 2006.
19 D.H. and Others, supra note 18.
20 Ibid., paras 175–177.
21 Ibid., para. 181.
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Having thus set out the general principles applying to this case, the Grand Chamber 
framed the specific issue as one of  indirect discrimination, namely whether:
the manner in which the legislation was applied in practice resulted in a disproportionate num-
ber of  Roma children – including the applicants – being placed in special schools for children 
with mental deficiencies without justification, and whether such children were thereby placed 
at a significant disadvantage.22
Beginning with the relevance of  statistical evidence as a way to establish a prima facie 
case of  indirect discrimination, the ECtHR held that the statistics provided by the appli-
cants, showing that 56 per cent of  all pupils placed in special schools in Ostrava were 
Roma, were sufficient evidence to create a rebuttable presumption of  indirect discrimi-
nation and shift the burden of  proof  onto the government.23 In the end, the prejudicial 
effects resulting from the placement in special schools led to a finding of  non-propor-
tionality under the objective and reasonable justification test and, thus, to a violation of  
Article 14 of  the ECHR, read in conjunction with Article 2 of  Protocol 1.24
The importance of  D.H.  and Others cannot be overestimated. With this Grand 
Chamber judgment, the ECtHR was finally aligning itself  with European law on indi-
rect discrimination. Moreover, relying on international and comparative material show-
ing the general and structural situation of  discrimination that Roma are exposed to in 
the Czech Republic and in the Ostrava region, the Court declined having to analyse the 
case of  each single applicant since a significant disadvantage was deemed to be almost 
a given. For this reason, the judgment has been defined as revolutionary, rather than 
a mere renovation or evolution of  the ECtHR’s case law on indirect racial discrimina-
tion.25 Crucially, D.H. and Others has not remained an isolated case. Quite the contrary, 
the Court has since confirmed, and even further built on, this case in subsequent judg-
ments, thus symbolically stressing the seriousness of  ethnic discrimination.26
B Gender Violence as Discrimination
Over the years, another form of  discrimination, namely gender discrimination in the 
form of  gender violence, has also gained increasing recognition in the case law of  
the ECtHR, benefiting also from the mentioned shift towards substantive understand-
ings of  equality. Developments in this domain are arguably best epitomized by Opuz 
v. Turkey,27 which built on some of  the Court’s previous decisions.28 In Opuz, the Court 
22 Ibid., para. 185.
23 Ibid., paras 187–195.
24 Ibid., paras 208–210. Protocol 1 to the ECHR 1993, ETS 151.
25 Dubout, ‘L’interdiction des discriminations indirectes par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme: 
rénovation ou révolution?’, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2008) 821.
26 See Sampanis and Others v. Greece, Appl. no. 32526/05, Judgment of  5 June 2008; Sampanis v. Greece, 
Appl. no. 59608/09, Judgment of  11 December 2012; Lavida and Others v. Greece, Appl. no. 7973/10, 
Judgment of  30 May 2013; Oršuš and Others v.  Croatia, Appl. no.  15766/03, Judgment of  16 March 
2010; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, Appl. no. 11146/11, Judgment of  29 January 2013.
27 Opuz v. Turkey, Appl. no. 33401/02, Judgment of  9 June 2009.
28 See, notably, Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, Appl. no. 71127/01, Judgment of  12 June 2008. Here the Court 
acknowledged Bulgaria’s responsibility for breach of  Art. 8 (right to respect of  private and family life) for 
failure to protect the applicant and her young son from the violent behaviour of  her former husband.
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held that a state had a positive obligation to defend women from ‘private’ violence 
and that a failure to do so in fact amounted to sex discrimination, thereby echoing the 
growing international recognition of  gender violence as a form of  sex discrimination, 
given its largely disparate impact on women and its contribution to the entrenchment 
of  gender subordination.29
The applicant, Nahide Opuz, had been subjected to different forms of  physical and 
psychological mistreatment by her husband, including death threats, which he also 
directed against her mother, whom he eventually shot dead. For years, the facts had 
been brought to the attention of  state officials, but with no significant effect on the 
protection of  Opuz and her mother, and after the death of  the applicant’s mother, 
the state had failed to duly prosecute and punish the perpetrator. In addressing the 
case, the ECtHR held the state responsible for failing to exercise due diligence to ade-
quately protect women from domestic violence, spelling out some of  the practical 
obligations that such protection required and that the Turkish state had failed to pro-
vide.30 Looking at the events, not as isolated incidents but, rather, as part of  a pattern 
amounting to a situation of  risk, the Court recognized that a state’s failure to exercise 
due diligence to protect women against domestic violence, when it ‘knows or ought to 
have known of  the situation’,31 breached its positive obligation of  taking ‘preventive 
operational measures’.32
In order to examine and characterize the general situation of  violence against 
women, including domestic violence, in Turkey as being discriminatory, the decision 
relied on criteria proposed by international bodies33 as well as on reports by non-gov-
ernmental organizations suggesting that domestic violence was generally tolerated by 
the authorities in the region. Basing the facts of  the individual case in the general con-
text of  discrimination against women in Turkey, the ECtHR concluded that the failure 
to exercise due diligence amounted not only to a violation of  the right to life of  the 
applicant’s mother, and the right to freedom of  inhuman or degrading treatment of  
the applicant (Articles 2 and 3 of  the ECHR) but also to the prohibition of  gender-based 
discrimination under Article 14 of  the Convention, in relation to those other rights, 
because of  the differential impact that the state’s inaction had on women.34 Tellingly, 
the applicant’s reliance on general statistical information was taken to be sufficient to 
show the existence of  a prima facie indication of  discrimination, which, in view of  the 
judicial passivity towards violence against women, the Turkish authorities could not 
29 UN Committee on the Elimination of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), General 
Recommendation No. 19: Violence against Women, UN Doc. A/47/38 (1992), cited by the ECtHR in 
Opuz, supra note 27, para. 74.
30 In particular, it highlighted the need for enforceable measures of  protection as well as a legislative frame-
work enabling criminal prosecutions of  domestic violence in the public interest regardless of  the with-
drawal of  charges by the private party in the most serious cases.
31 Opuz, supra note 27, para. 130.
32 Ibid., para. 148.
33 Such as the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
1979, 1249 UNTS 13, and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of  Violence against Women 1994, 33 ILM 1534. See Opuz, supra note 27, para. 185.
34 Ibid., paras 200, 201 and concluding para. 7.
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disprove.35 Although Opuz was the first time that the ECtHR had appreciated gender 
violence as a form of  discrimination, other cases have followed that have allowed the 
Court to confirm its basic doctrine on state responsibility for violence against women 
by non-state actors36 – a doctrine that has been built with the building blocks of  dis- 
parate impact discrimination and the evidentiary value of  statistics portraying a gen-
eral state of  things.37
3 Anti-Discrimination Exceptionalism: Racist Violence 
before the ECtHR
Within this larger evolution of  the ECtHR’s discrimination case law, one area seems to 
have remained almost immune from these doctrinal evolutions, namely racist violence. 
What is striking is that this is not a minor subject area but, rather, the pre-dominant type 
of  fact pattern in the Court’s non-discrimination case docket. The Court’s initial position 
on Article 14, when brought into conjunction with the violation of  Article 2 (on the right 
to life) and/or Article 3 (on the prohibition of  torture and inhuman or degrading treat-
ment), was quite clear: outright denial. Thus, in the year 2000, in Velikova v. Bulgaria,38 
which concerned a Roma man who had died after spending 12 hours in police custody 
following his arrest and detention on charges of  cattle theft, the ECtHR found a violation 
of  Article 2, yet no Article 14 violation, in spite of  the fact that a police officer had referred 
to the victim as a ‘Gypsy’39 and that another investigator had noted that the injuries on 
the victim’s body were not visible due to the ‘dark colour of  his skin’.40 While remarking 
that there were serious reasons to take on Article 14 complaints, the Court nevertheless 
applied a ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard to the motives behind the conduct.41
35 Ibid., para. 198.
36 See E.S. and Others v. Slovakia, Appl. no. 8227/04, Judgment of  15 September 2009; Rantsev v. Cyprus and 
Russia, Appl. no. 25965/04, Judgment of  7 January 2010; A. v. Croatia, Appl. no. 55164/08, Judgment 
of  14 October 2010; Hajduová v. Slovakia, Appl. no. 2660/03, Judgment of  13 November 2010. The ‘Opuz 
line’ was left aside in the recent judgment of  A.A. and Others v. Sweden, Appl. no. 14499/09, Judgment of  
28 June 2012, yet picked up again in Valiulienė v. Lithuania, Appl. no. 33234/07, Judgment of  26 March 
2013.
37 A violation of  Art. 14 has not been found in every single instance but clearly Opuz remains valid law. See, 
e.g., four recent cases in which the ECtHR explicitly relied on Opuz to confirm that the state’s failure to 
protect women against domestic violence amounted to an Article 14 violation: Eremia and Others v. the 
Republic of  Moldova, Appl. no. 3564/11, Judgment of  28 May 2013; Mudric v. the Republic of  Moldova, Appl. 
no. 74839/10, Judgment of  16 July 2013; B. v. Republic of  Moldova, Appl. no. 61382/09, Judgment of  16 
July 2013; T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of  Moldova, Appl. no. 26608/11, Judgment of  28 January 2014.
38 Velikova v. Bulgaria, Appl. no. 41488/98, Judgment of  18 May 2000. The case had already been preceded 
by Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, Appl. no. 24760/94, Judgment of  28 October 1998, involving violence 
against Roma people, but here no separate Article 14 claim had been brought. For a critique of  this line of  
cases, see Möschel, ‘Is the European Court of  Human Rights’ Case Law on Anti-Roma Violence “beyond 
Reasonable Doubt”?’, 12 Human Rights Law Review (2012) 479.
39 Velikova, supra note 38, paras 15, 16 and 18.
40 Ibid., para. 26.
41 For the Court, the ‘material before it does not enable [it] to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that [the] 
death and the lack of  a meaningful investigation into it were motivated by racial prejudice as claimed by 
the applicant.’ Ibid., para. 94.
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An essentially analogous reasoning was adopted two years later in Anguelova 
v. Bulgaria, a 2002 judgment,42 even though, this time, in what has arguably become 
the key dissenting opinion in cases dealing with racist violence by the police, Judge 
Bonello scathingly criticized the ECtHR’s arbitrariness in adopting the standard of  
proof  beyond reasonable doubt43 and proposed some concrete changes to the juris-
prudence of  Article 14, such as shifting the burden of  proof  to the respondent state 
and/or extending the doctrine of  ‘procedural violation’, which were already operative 
for Articles 2 and 3.44 Judge Bonello’s dissent seems to have had some effect on the 
Court’s case law. Indeed, starting with the Grand Chamber’s decision in Nachova and 
Others v. Bulgaria in 2005,45 an increasing number of  cases involving racist violence 
against Roma people have ended up with the Court at least finding a procedural vio-
lation. Such findings have taken place mainly in cases of  private violence – that is, 
where the state is only responsible for insufficient and/or slow investigations and/or 
trials into the racist background of  the violence and in cases of  police violence where 
the state has failed to investigate or prosecute the racist background of  its own agents.
Judge Bonello’s dissent seems to also have somewhat tempered the Court’s almost 
automatic referral to the burden of  proof  ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’46 Indeed, in 
the Nachova Chamber decision, the Court stated that the ‘standard should not be 
interpreted as requiring such a high degree of  probability as in criminal trials’ and 
that ‘proof  may follow from the co-existence of  sufficiently strong, clear and con-
cordant inferences or of  similar unrebutted presumptions of  fact’, resisting ‘sug-
gestions to establish rigid evidentiary rules’ and adhering to the ‘principle of  free 
assessment of  all evidence’.47 In the Grand Chamber decision that followed, while 
still referring to a high standard of  proof, the Court noticed that ‘its role is not 
to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States’ responsibility 
under the Convention’.48
In spite of  these findings, the ECtHR in Nachova stopped short of  embracing the 
plain test of  whether Roma people or other racial minorities are being treated differ-
ently in similar situations, which is the standard test in most other non-discrimination 
cases, much less admitted the evidentiary relevance of  statistics in order to establish 
a prima facie case that would shift the burden of  proof  to the state. This result can be 
in part explained by another aspect emerging from Nachova, namely the (conceptual) 
42 Anguelova v. Bulgaria, Appl. no. 38361/97, Judgment of  13 June 2002, paras 167, 168.
43 Ibid. paras 9–11 (Bonello dissenting).
44 Ibid., paras 13–18 (Bonello dissenting). This distinction between procedural and substantive ECHR right 
violations is important. The former occurs when a state’s investigation into the alleged human rights 
violation was insufficient, thereby violating the ECHR, whereas the latter means that the state is found 
guilty for the actual human rights violation itself. The ECtHR had already accepted this distinction for 
Art. 2 (McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, Appl. no. 18984/91, Judgment of  27 September 1995) and 
for Art. 3 (Assenov and Others, supra note 38).
45 Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, Appl. nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, Judgment of  28 February 2002.
46 The Court had derived this extremely high standard from an early case. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Appl. 
no. 5310/71, Judgment of  18 January 1978.
47 Nachova and Others, supra note 45, para. 166.
48 Ibid., para. 147.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/26/4/881/2599606
by UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA user
on 08 June 2018
890 EJIL 26 (2015), 881–899
separation of  (racist) violence cases from other discrimination cases. In the words of  
the Court:
[w]hile in the legal systems of  many countries proof  of  the discriminatory effect of  a policy 
or decision will dispense with the need to prove intent in respect of  alleged discrimination in 
employment or the provision of  services, that approach is difficult to transpose to a case where 
it is alleged that an act of  violence was racially motivated.49
Looking for evidence of  specific motives has prevented the Court from asking gener-
ally whether, in view of  the evidence before it, it can simply accept that certain ethnic 
minorities are more likely than others to be victims of  police, state or private violence 
and probably from finding violations of  Article 14 more easily once it is faced with a 
concrete case of  relevant indicia.
General information and statistics could be relied upon to set presumptions and shift the 
burden of  proof  (as in the Roma education or the gender violence context), alleviating the 
victim from the almost impossible task of  demonstrating a particular subjective attitude. 
Yet this way of  proceeding has been the rare exception.50 In the end, the obsession around 
individual motives has blinded the ECtHR to the fact that all that really matters is that, in 
view of  both general patterns and concrete indicia, the Court is convinced that the ethnicity 
of  the person is likely to have been related to his/her victimization in accounting for why, 
how and how much violence was inflicted upon him or her (that is, different treatment).
Doctrinal framing will have to change for the numbers to change as well, consider-
ing that so far the overall balance is – not surprisingly – unpromising. In numerous 
judgments and decisions dealing with violence against Roma, Kurds, Chechens and 
other racial(ized) and/or religious minorities, the ECtHR – or the Commission under 
the previous ECHR’s system – has rejected the Article 14 claim in separate admis-
sibility decisions;51 accepted a worryingly high number of  friendly settlements52 and 
unilateral declarations;53 rejected the Article 14 claim in its merits54 or only found 
49 Ibid., para. 157.
50 Notice, however, that the ECtHR has not ruled out the possibility in theory. Thus, in Mižigárová v. Slovakia, 
Appl. no. 74832/01, Judgment of  14 December 2010, para. 117, the Court affirmed that, in view of  
‘contemporaneous reports documenting – allegation of  police brutality’ ... ‘[i]n respect of  persons of  
Roma origin, it would not exclude the possibility that in a particular case the existence of  independent 
evidence of  a systemic problem could, in the absence of  any other evidence, be sufficient to alert the 
authorities to the possible existence of  a racist motive’.
51 See, e.g., Ilhan v. Turkey, Appl. no. 22277/93, Judgment of  27 June 2000. Complaints under Art. 14 were no 
longer maintained after the Commission declared there had been no violation under Art. 14. Notar v. Romania, 
Appl. no. 42860/98, Judgment of  13 November 2003; K.H. and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), Appl. no. 32881/04, 
Judgment of  9 October 2007; Ferhat Kaya v. Turkey, Appl. no. 12673/05, Judgment of  25 September 2012.
52 Friendly settlements are negotiated settlements between the applicant and the respondent state. See, e.g., 
Ferenčíková v. Czech Republic, Appl. no. 21826/10, Judgment of  30 August 2011; R.K. v. Czech Republic, 
Appl. no. 7883/08, Judgment of  27 November 2012.
53 When a friendly settlement has failed, the respondent state can nevertheless acknowledge the violation of  a 
ECHR right and promises redress by unilateral declaration. Against the applicant’s will, the Court can accept 
such declarations and strike the case out of  the records. See, e.g., Kalanyos v. Romania, Appl. no. 57884/00, 
Judgment of  26 April 2007; Alder v. United Kingdom, Appl. no. 42078/02, Judgment of  22 November 2011.
54 See, e.g., Menteş and Others v.  Turkey, Appl. no.  23186/94, Judgment of  28 November 1997; Kaya 
v. Turkey, Appl. no. 22729/93, Judgment of  19 February 1998; Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria, Appl. 
no.  46317/99, Judgment of  23 February 2006; Sashov and Others v.  Bulgaria, Appl. no.  14383/03, 
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/26/4/881/2599606
by UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA user
on 08 June 2018
Anti-Discrimination Exceptionalism 891
a procedural Article 14 violation.55 Add those cases in which no Article 14 claim 
was brought, even though the violence involved a racial minority,56 those that were 
declared inadmissible from the start57 or those that are still pending,58 and one gets 
roughly 90 cases of  death, violence and bodily harm against racial(ized) minorities 
that have been dealt with by the ECtHR. While in many of  these cases, the judges did 
find a substantive and/or procedural violation of  Articles 2 and/or 3 of  the ECHR, 
in very few cases has it found a substantive violation of  Article 14.59 Not promising 
indeed.
4 The Explanatory Hypothesis: The Holocaust Prism and 
Forced Sterilization
So what causes this discrepancy in the ECtHR between the general evolution of  the 
non-discrimination doctrine in regard to the (ir)relevance of  intent and the shift of  
the burden of  proof, especially in cases of  well-documented patterns of  discrimination 
and the approach taken in racist violence cases? There is probably not one single com-
prehensive answer to this question, and all we can look for are plausible hypotheses. 
One aspect has already been alluded to earlier and can be related to the fact that the 
Court itself  first distinguishes the racial violence cases from those of  employment or 
provision of  services60 and then explicitly extends this distinction to education.61 This 
separation could be explained by the fact that these violence cases most often arise in a 
Judgment of  7 January 2010; I.G. and Others v. Slovakia, Appl. no. 15966/04, Judgment of  13 November 
2012; Amadayev v. Russia, Appl. no. 18114/06, Judgment of  3 July 2014.
55 This group of  cases includes both state and private violence cases (indicated by S and P respectively). 
Only in state-sponsored violence cases can the ECtHR find a substantive Article 14 violation. See, e.g., 
Nachova and Others, supra note 45 (S); Milanovic v. Serbia, Appl. no. 44614/07, Judgment of  14 December 
2010 (P); B.S. v. Spain, Appl. no. 47159/08, Judgment of  24 July 2012 (S); Virabyan v. Armenia, Appl. 
no. 40094/05, Judgment of  2 October 2012 (S); Abdu v. Bulgaria, Appl. no. 26827/08, Judgment of  11 
March 2014 (P).
56 See, e.g., Đurđević v. Croatia, Appl. no. 52442/09, Judgment of  19 July 2011; Eremiášová and Pechová 
v. Czech Republic, Appl. no. 23944/04, Judgment of  16 February 2012 (as revised on 20 June 2013); 
Borbála Kiss v. Hungary, Appl. no. 59214/11, Judgment of  26 June 2012.
57 See, e.g., Puky v.  Slovakia (dec.), Appl. no.  45383/07, Judgment of  14 February 2012; Červeňáková 
v. Czech Republic (dec.), Appl. no. 26852/09, Judgment of  23 October 2012; Z.K. v. Slovakia (dec.), Appl. 
no. 13606/11, Judgment of  1 April 2014.
58 See, e.g., Fogarasi and Others v. Romania, Appl. no. 67590/2010, lodged on 15 November 2010; Boacă 
and Others v. Romania, Appl. no. 40355/11, lodged on 13 June 2011; Boacă and Others v. Romania, Appl. 
no. 40374/11, lodged on 13 June 2011; R.B. v. Hungary, Appl. no. 64602/12, lodged on 2 October 2012; 
Adam v. Slovakia, Appl. no. 68066/12, lodged on 22 October 2012; Cioban and Others v. Romania, Appl. 
no. 58616/13, lodged on 6 September 2013.
59 Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), Appl. nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, Judgment of  12 July 2005 
(even though, strictly speaking, the Art. 14 violation was found in conjunction with Art. 6 and not with 
Arts 2 or 3); Stoica v. Romania, Appl. no. 42722/02, Judgment of  4 March 2008; Makhashevy v. Russia, 
Appl. no.  20546/07, Judgment of  31 July 2012; Antayev and Others v.  Russia, Appl. no.  37966/07, 
Judgment of  3 July 2014.
60 See Nachova and Others, supra note 45.
61 See, e.g., D.H. and Others, supra note 17, as confirmed by Horváth and Kiss, supra note 26, para. 106.
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national criminal law context, where, in order to affirm the racist nature of  the crime, 
the requirement of  mens rea (that is, not only the intent to kill, harm or sterilize but 
also to do so motivated exclusively by racism) is typically one of  the necessary elements 
of  the crime, which the prosecution will need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
Being familiar with these principles from their national practice and experience, or fear-
ing that its finding of  an Article 14 violation may suggest or lead to criminal domestic pros-
ecution of  state agents for acts and crimes, it is not surprising that the judges in the ECtHR 
are tempted to simply transpose their national criminal law standards to their interpreta-
tion of  racist violence under Article 14 of  the ECHR. Unlike in cases of  gender violence, 
which mostly deal with positive obligations (and, thus, more indirect violations) on the part 
of  the state, and other (mostly education-related) race discrimination cases, where the vio-
lation does not focus on a specific act of  deliberate harms (resulting from a seemingly neu-
tral policy), the Court may simply be reluctant to directly attribute racism to specific state 
actors for violent conduct, mainly because these kinds of  actions tend to be serious criminal 
offences under domestic law and, as such, carry a particular stigma as well.
However, this may not be the entire explanation, for some of  the cases have been 
framed explicitly as civil cases before reaching the ECtHR, with the plaintiffs demand-
ing compensation as a form of  civil redress.62 More importantly, nor can it be a 
convincing explanation, considering that the plaintiff  in these cases is not a public 
prosecutor and the consequences for the defendant are not a criminal sanction but, 
rather, international liability for human rights violations and the payment of  some 
sort of  damages. Criminal responsibility would have to be decided separately and 
under the adequate domestic and/or international criminal law standards. What is 
interesting, however, is that even in those few cases where the judges self-reflectively 
elaborate on relevant differences, the results do not seem to change significantly.63
A second account may be related to the ECtHR’s difficulty in recognizing race dis-
crimination claims more broadly, a phenomenon that Marie-Bénédicte Dembour has 
referred to as ‘post-colonial denial’.64 According to Dembour, the Court’s poor record 
is caused by a structural failure to recognize the historical relevance of  empire and 
(post-)colonialism in most cases involving race discrimination claims. By conceptually 
linking (post-)colonialism to Edward Said’s Orientalism and to the fact that Western 
Europe has considered Eastern Europe to be some sort of  Russian colony and, thus, as 
‘demi-Orientalized’, Dembour is able to include the anti-Roma violence cases in her 
post-colonial denial framework.65
62 The civil proceedings brought at the national level in most of  the forced sterilization cases, of  which there 
is more in detail later in this article, as well as in some of  the other racist violence cases were part of  the 
procedural picture in which the plaintiffs did not obtain any satisfaction. See, e.g., Mižigárová, supra note 
50, paras 48–54; Vasil Sashov Petrov v. Bulgaria, Appl. no. 63106/00, Judgment of  10 June 2010, para. 21.
63 See, e.g., Nachova and Others, supra note 45, para. 147; Virabyan, supra note 55, para. 202, where the 
ECtHR explicitly noticed that its role was not ‘to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting 
States’ responsibility under the Convention’.
64 Dembour, ‘Postcolonial Denial: Why the European Court of  Human Rights Finds It So Difficult to 
Acknowledge Racism’, in K. Clarke and M. Goodale (eds), Mirrors of  Justice: Law and Power in the Post-Cold 
War Era (2009) 45.
65 Ibid., at 51–53. E. Said, Orientalism (1979).
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Agreeing with this broader framing of  the challenge, we posit that yet another 
rationale – which again relates to the unconscious, extra-judicial level of  decision 
making and the role of  history – may specifically underlie those race cases that involve 
state-sponsored violence – a hypothesis that we refer to as the ‘Holocaust Prism’. The 
idea is that the Holocaust trauma has shaped what the ECtHR understands to be the 
paradigmatic experience of  racism, at least when life or bodily integrity (including 
reproductive integrity) is affected. This connection automatically invites a Gestalt 
shift, whereby those standards that were developed as a response to the Holocaust 
experience, articulated mostly around the definition of  genocide and crimes against 
humanity, become predominant.66 In doing so, the Court basically regards the dis-
crimination claim through the lenses and standards of  national and international 
criminal law in a way that renders the grasping of  ordinary institutional racism by 
state agents, including the police, more difficult.67 It forgets, in other words, that, 
under international human rights law, discrimination does not require any kind of  
specific animus, referring instead to any unjustified distinction, exclusion, restriction, 
preference or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly based on a set 
of  (non-exhaustive) prohibited grounds of  discrimination – including race and eth-
nic and national origin – with the intention or effect of  nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of  human rights and fundamental freedoms on 
an equal footing.68
The problem is that having genocide in the back of  one’s mind when analys-
ing racial violence cases will make it extremely hard to find an Article 14 violation, 
not only because of  the ECtHR’s understandable reluctance to act as a criminal law 
court69 but also in view of  the seriousness of  the accusation and the political reactions 
that may ensue from accused state parties. Ironically then, the closer the forms of  
discriminatory violence resemble those that actually occurred under the Holocaust 
(physical abuse by state officials, systematic killings and forced sterilizations, includ-
ing of  Roma people), the less likely the Court is to be inclined to denounce the practice 
66 Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 6 defines 
genocide as ‘any of  the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnic, racial or religious group,’ such as: ‘(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group’. Among the list of  crimes against humanity, as acts which must be committed as part of  a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, Art. 7 (g) of  the Rome Statute 
includes ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of  sexual violence of  comparable gravity’ (emphasis added).
67 The ECtHR’s approach is in contrast with the evolution around racial violence in some European coun-
tries. In the United Kingdom, following the police mishandling of  the investigation into the murder of  
Stephen Lawrence (a young black man), a judicial inquiry found heavy institutional racism in the London 
police, which defined institutional racism in its report without any reference to intent. See M. Bell, Racism 
and Equality in the European Union (2009), at 11.
68 See this definition in UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CERD Committee), General 
Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 2 
July 2009, para. 7. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3, 
Art. 2, para. 2.
69 On this reluctance, see S.C. Grover, The European Court of  Human Rights as a Pathway to Impunity for 
International Crimes (2010), in particular 93–129, discussing forced sterilizations of  Roma women.
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as racial discrimination, duly taking into account the broader context as documented 
in reports and statistics. Instead, it is far more likely that it will analyse it according to 
the elements enshrined in criminal law to determine individual criminal responsibil-
ity. This may explain why, even when the Court acknowledges that racism might be at 
work, it refuses to call it such, either finding only a procedural violation or ‘hiding’ the 
race discrimination analysis under another article of  the ECHR.70
The best example of  how this Holocaust Prism may be distorting the ECtHR’s under-
standing of  racist violence as a form of  discrimination can be gleaned from a group 
of  cases that, in terms of  the phenomenology of  violence, closely resemble – to put it 
mildly – certain expressions of  Holocaust violence, namely those cases concerning the 
forced sterilization of  Roma women in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.71 The cases are 
also particularly striking because although they affect Roma women and could have 
been approached through the primordial lenses of  gender violence as an acknowledged 
form of  discrimination, the race element in them seems to have completely overshad-
owed the gender dimension. This has prevented the doctrine of  gender violence as a 
form of  discrimination, firmly established in Opuz v. Turkey, from coming to the fore 
and has invited instead the genocidal parameters to prevail, rendering the naming and 
condemning of  racial/ethnic discrimination impossible. Let us take a closer look.
A Forced Sterilization of  Roma Women under the ECHR
Forced sterilization or compulsory sterilization occurs when surgical sterilization is 
performed on a person without that person’s consent. From the 1920s on, examples 
inspired by eugenics can be found all over the world.72 Certainly the most infamous 
ones are the Nazi German sterilization programs targeting Jews, Roma and disabled 
people, which were introduced by law in July 1933.73 However, even countries often 
70 See, e.g., Koky and Others v. Slovakia, Appl. no. 13624/03, Judgment of  12 June 2012. Notice, however, that 
the understanding of  racial violence as a form of  racial discrimination has at least been partly captured by 
the CERD Committee. In 1993, in paragraph 1 of  its General Recommendation No. 15, the CERD Committee 
reiterated that when the International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination 
was being adopted (in 1965), ‘article 4 [which compels States to declare an offence punishable by law all acts 
of  violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of  persons] was regarded as central to the 
struggle against racial discrimination. At that time, there was a widespread fear of  the revival of  authoritar-
ian ideologies’. CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 15: Organized Violence Based on Ethnic 
Origin, UN Doc. A/48/18, 23 March 1993, Art. 4. Moreover, in 2000, the same Committee issued General 
Recommendation No. 27, which in s. 2, paras 12–16, includes a whole section on the obligation of  state par-
ties to adopt ‘[m]easures for protection against racial violence’. CERD Committee, General Recommendation 
No. 27: Discrimination against Roma of  UN Doc. A/55/18, 16 August 2000, Annex V.
71 In chronological order, K.H.  and Others v.  Slovakia, Appl. no.  32881/04, Judgment of  28 April 2009; 
M.V.  v.  Slovakia, (dec.), Appl. no.  62079/09, Judgment of  23 November 2010; Ferenčíková, supra 
note 52; V.C.  v.  Slovakia, Appl. no.  18968/07, Judgment of  8 November 2011; N.B.  v.  Slovakia, Appl. 
no. 29518/10, Judgment of  12 June 2012; Červeňáková, supra note 57; I.G. and Others, supra note 54; 
R.K. v. Czech Republic, supra note 52; Z.K. v. Slovakia, supra note 57.
72 For more details on the emergence of  eugenic sterilization policies, see Tredhan and Crowhurst, ‘Coerced 
Sterilization and Female Genital Mutilation in Europe’, in H. Widdows, I.A. Idiakez and A.E. Cirión (eds), 
Women’s Reproductive Rights (2006) 89.
73 Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses (Act for the Prevention of  Hereditarily Diseased 
Offspring) 14 July 1933, RGBl. I (1933) 529.
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associated with high human rights standards, such as Switzerland, Sweden and a 
number of  states of  the USA,74 performed forced sterilizations on groups considered to 
be social and racial deviants. Even though sterilizations are easier to perform on men, 
most of  the time it is women who are deprived of  their reproductive functions. Forced 
sterilizations may amount to genocide75 as well as to a crime against humanity under 
international criminal law.76
One of  the areas of  the world where forced sterilizations have taken place in the 
past, at least during the Nazi and communist regime, and keep taking place today, is 
the territory of  the Czech Republic and Slovakia, formerly Czechoslovakia. The entry 
into force of  a national Sterilization Regulation in 1972 seems to have increased, or 
simply further bolstered, an existing practice.77 This piece of  legislation established 
a legal framework for sterilization with specific and strict requirements that were to 
be enforced. Sterilizations were allowed in a medical institution, either at the request 
of  the person concerned or with her consent, if  the person’s reproductive organs 
were affected by disease (section 2(a) of  the Sterilization Regulation), or when a 
pregnancy or birth would seriously threaten the life or health of  a woman, whose 
reproductive organs were not affected by disease (section 2(b) of  the Sterilization 
Regulation). The decision on whether or not the sterilization was required was taken 
by the head physician of  the hospital department in which the person concerned 
was treated. Sterilizations on any other ground needed to be approved by a medical 
committee.
Nothing in the Sterilization Regulation specifically refers to Roma women. It is in 
its implementation that this aspect of  the Regulation emerged, having been inter-
preted by the medical practitioners as an authorization or encouragement to sterilize 
Roma women, in particular, with their consent, often obtained under dubious circum-
stances. Moreover, in the practice that emerged over the years, only Roma women (not 
ethnically Czechoslovakian women) were offered financial compensation in exchange 
for sterilization. In other words, an otherwise race-neutral legislation became racial-
ized through its application, due to the existing racism against Roma people.78 With 
the end of  the Communist regime in 1989 and the split of  the former Czechoslovakia 
into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the question became whether this policy and its 
interpretation would continue unabated.
74 On the USA’s history on compulsory sterilization laws, see Silver, ‘Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization 
Laws: Providing Redress for the Victims of  a Shameful Era in United States History’, 72 George Washington 
Law Review (2004) 862.
75 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 66, Art. 6, para. (d); United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide, 1948, 78 UNTS 277, Art. 2.
76 See Rome Statute, supra note 66, Art. 7, para. 1(g).
77 Vyhláška Ministerstva zdravotníctva Slovenskej socialistickej republiky č. Z-4 582/1972-B/1, uverejnená 
vo Vestníku ministerstva zdravotníctva (Regulation of  the Ministry of  Health of  the Slovak Socialist 
Republic Containing Guidelines Governing Sterilisation in Medical Practice), No. Z-4 582/1972-B/1 
(1972).
78 For more details on the social context in which such a regulation has emerged, and the application 
towards Roma women, see Sokolová, ‘Planned Parenthood Behind the Curtain: Population Policy and 
Sterilization of  Romani Women in Communist Czechoslovakia, 1972–1989’, 23 Anthropology of  East 
Europe Review (2005) 79.
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A 2003 report, which became known as the Body and Soul Report, looked into this 
topic.79 A number of  interviews with more than 230 Romani women from 40 differ-
ent settlements throughout eastern Slovakia, as well as fact-finding missions, eventu-
ally showed that Roma women continued to be targeted under such policies. The Body 
and Soul Report showed a devastatingly clear and recurring pattern in the sterilization 
of  Roma women, which included, in varying degrees, either one, or a combination, 
of  the following elements: false or misguiding information by the medical personnel; 
performance of  multiple Caesarean sections leading to sterilization, usually after the 
second child; signing of  a consent form while in labour; incentive payments for Roma 
women to get sterilized; racial insults from hospital personnel; racial segregation in 
hospital rooms and, finally, refusal of  access to personal medical files.
Not surprisingly, the Body and Soul Report served as a direct basis for the first case on 
forced sterilizations to reach the ECtHR, the case of  K.H. and Others v. Slovakia, which 
was resolved in 2009 but limited to the refusal of  the authorities to grant the victims 
and/or their lawyers access to the medical records.80 Two years later, the ECtHR was 
confronted with the compatibility of  the actual sterilization practice with international 
human rights law.81 In V.C. v. Slovakia, the applicant, a 20-year-old Romani woman, 
was sterilized in a public hospital after giving birth to her second child. According to 
the hospital, the applicant had requested the sterilization. The applicant instead sub-
mitted that, after she had been in labour for several hours, she was told that if  she had 
one more child either her or the baby would die. She thus signed the delivery record 
while still in labour under the note indicating that she had requested sterilization. The 
applicant did not even understand the term sterilization since her mother tongue was 
Romani. Her medical record contained the words ‘patient is of  Roma origin,’ and dur-
ing her hospitalization she was accommodated in a room with only Roma women. 
Moreover, she was prevented from using the same bathrooms and toilets as women 
who were not of  Roma origin.
As a result of  the sterilization, the applicant suffered from serious medical, psycho-
logical, social and personal after-effects, including a false pregnancy, psychiatric treat-
ment, ostracism by the Roma community (which places great emphasis on women’s 
fertility) and divorce from her husband. In response to the publication of  the Body and 
Soul Report, criminal investigations were initiated by the government’s human rights 
division into the sterilization of  a number of  Roma women, but they were eventually 
discontinued on the grounds that no criminal offence had been committed. In this 
context, the applicant herself  started a civil proceeding seeking protection of  her per-
sonal rights. She submitted that the sterilization performed on her had been carried 
out in violation of  Slovakian legislation and international human rights standards. 
79 Centre for Reproductive Rights and Poradňa pre občianske a l’udské práva (Centre for Civil and Human 
Rights or Poradňa), Body and Soul: Forced Sterilizations and Other Assaults on Roma Reproductive Freedom in 
Slovakia (2003).
80 K.H. and Others, supra note 71.
81 Notice, however, that prior to this, the CEDAW Committee had already found that forced sterilizations 
on Roma women in Hungary violated CEDAW, supra note 33. See CEDAW Committee, A.S. v. Hungary, 
Communication No. 4/2004, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004 (2004).
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She argued that she had not been duly informed about the procedure as such, its con-
sequences and the alternative solutions. She requested an apology for the procedure 
and claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Her claims were rejected both 
at the initial trial level and in the appeal on the grounds that the sterilization of  the 
applicant had been performed in accordance with the legislation in force and that it 
had been required by the applicant’s medical condition. The constitutional complaint 
she initiated thereafter was also unfruitful.
Following these unsuccessful national proceedings, the applicant alleged a breach 
of  Articles 3, 8, 12, 13 and 14 of  the ECHR before the ECtHR. With regard to the 
Article 3 violation, the applicant was successful. Indeed, the Court sided with her 
argument that she had not been able to provide an informed consent to the steriliza-
tion on account of  the hours of  labour she had experienced, which affected the sound 
mind principle. Moreover, the Court noted that the sterilization could not be justified 
as an immediate, life-saving intervention for which informed consent can be waived, 
as any threat to the applicant’s health was only likely to happen in the event of  a 
future pregnancy. For these reasons, the Court held that Slovakia had violated Article 
3 of  the ECHR.82
The ECtHR also found an Article 8 violation, arguing that reproductive rights cer-
tainly fall within the purview of  Article 8. States need to protect individuals against 
arbitrary interference by public authorities, and they have a positive obligation to 
secure effective respect for the rights of  persons within their jurisdiction under this 
provision. This means that Slovakia had the obligation to put in place effective legal 
safeguards to protect the reproductive health of  women of  Roma origin since they 
were particularly vulnerable. In view of  this provision, the Court found that the posi-
tive obligations under Article 8 had been violated because no adequate legislation 
and exercise of  appropriate supervision of  sterilization practices had been put in 
place.83
However, with regard to Article 14’s prohibition of  discrimination claim, the Court 
ruled that a separate examination of  the complaint under Article 14 of  the ECHR was 
unnecessary. While acknowledging that the materials, statistics and reports before it 
indicated evidence of  a practice of  sterilization of  Roma women without their prior 
informed consent, the Court found that the information available was not sufficient 
to demonstrate, in a convincing manner, that the doctors had acted in bad faith with 
the intention of  ill-treating the applicant, that the sterilizations were part of  an org-
anized policy or that the hospital staff ’s conduct was intentionally racially motivated. 
Furthermore, since the Court had already established that Slovakia had failed to com-
ply with its positive obligation under Article 8, it was able to dismiss the need for a 
more in-depth and separate analysis of  the Article 14 argument.84 V.C. v. Slovakia has 
not remained an isolated case. In fact, the Court has confirmed its jurisprudence in 
two other forced sterilization cases: N.B. v. Slovakia and I.G. and Others v. Slovakia.85
82 V.C. v. Slovakia, supra note 71, paras 106–120.
83 Ibid., paras 138–155.
84 Ibid., paras 176–180.
85 N.B. v. Slovakia, supra note 71, paras 121–123; I.G. and Others v. Slovakia, supra note 54, paras 165–167.
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B Interpretive Lenses: the Holocaust Prism?
Forced sterilization jurisprudence can be taken to demonstrate the Holocaust Prism in 
full operation. First of  all, the perspective of  racial or ethnic discrimination prevails, 
pushing aside the specifically gendered dimension of  the cases, even when the victims 
also raise sex/gender discrimination claims.86 The ghost of  race/ethnic discrimina-
tion, which is so prevalent in the culturally predominant interpretation of  Holocaust 
violence,87 overshadows gender discrimination, with the intersecting discrimination 
between race and gender being completely bypassed in the forced sterilization deci-
sions. This is a missed opportunity for the ECtHR to give due visibility to the gender 
subordination of  the practice and to more intuitively apply its doctrine of  the state’s 
failure to live up to its positive or negative obligations concerning gender violence as a 
form of  gender discrimination and, hence, as a violation of  Article 14.
Second, the anti-discrimination logic is debunked by the genocidal/criminal para-
digm, which leads the ECtHR to totally disregard its standard equality doctrine. Thus, 
in determining whether there might have been an Article 14 violation at play, the 
Court looked for an organized policy backing the forced sterilization practice and 
found that there was not sufficiently strong evidence for this policy. Alternatively, 
the judges focused on whether ‘the hospital staff ’s conduct was intentionally racially 
motivated’.88 However, as we have observed, intent was not a requirement in either 
D.H.  and Others or in Opuz, epitomizing the Court’s most progressive equality juris-
prudence. This again goes to show that, when life or physical integrity are at stake in 
conjunction with racist actions, the Court situates itself  in the Holocaust paradigm.
Third, the focus on the need to show individual intent, and, in fact, even a system-
atic policy, has an obvious impact on what amounts to sufficient evidence and on 
who has the primary burden of  proof. By looking too closely at the individual cases 
to decide whether or not there is sufficient evidence of  intent – as the ECtHR has done 
previously when addressing other racial violence cases – 89 the Court undermines the 
relevance of  context and demonstrates systemic insufficiencies, acknowledged in its 
case law on racial discrimination in the educational context and on gender violence, 
both of  which have heavily relied on the evidentiary value of  statistics and reports 
documenting structural discrimination.
Fourth, the Gestalt shift in the interpretation of  Article 14, from the discrimination 
paradigm to a genocidal one, forces the ECtHR to identify indirect ways of  expressing 
its rejection of  the ethnic discriminatory aspect, without, however, condemning the 
states for it. In V.C. v. Slovakia, once the elements of  the crime were not found, the ex- 
istence of  a violation of  Article 14 was marginalized to such an extent that it was not 
even considered worthy of  serious separate consideration. In fact, the Court ends up 
squeezing the Article 14 analysis into its Article 8 reasoning, referring to the ‘positive 
obligation under Article 8 to secure through its legal system the rights guaranteed 
86 See, e.g., V.C. v. Slovakia, supra note 71, para. 169.
87 See, e.g., Ringelheim, ‘The Unethical and the Unspeakable: Women and the Holocaust’, 1 Simon 
Wiesenthal Annual (1984) 69.
88 V.C. v. Slovakia, supra note 71, para. 177 (emphasis added).
89 See, e.g., Mižigárová, supra note 50.
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by that Article, by putting in place effective legal safeguards to protect the reproduc-
tive health of  women of  Roma origin in particular,’ given their vulnerability, indicating 
that ‘the reference in the record to the applicant’s ethnic origin without further details 
being given indicates … a certain mindset on the part of  the medical staff  as to the manner 
in which the medical situation of  a Roma woman should be managed.’90
However, this move is not without consequences. Not only does ignoring a separate 
Article 14 claim reduce its autonomous importance, but it also completely bypasses 
the underlying reason for those fact patterns, namely that the violence happens to 
individuals belonging to oppressed minorities to a large extent, if  not exclusively, 
because they belong to such a minority, thus contributing to the larger discrimina-
tory environment and subordination of  the groups. Moreover, it prevents victims from 
obtaining full recognition for the discrimination and humiliation they suffered as 
well as rendering duly visible the structural dimension of  the violations and the way 
society as a whole, and not just the concrete victims of  the case, is affected by their 
occurrence. Finally, at the level of  the implementation of  judgments, it prevents the 
encouragement of  programs and general measures to combat the broader phenom-
enon of  racial violence and discrimination by public authorities.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have tried to explain and link two different, yet related, phenom-
ena. On the one hand, we highlight the empirically observed trend of  the ECtHR’s 
reluctance to recognize the discriminatory aspects of  racial violence in its case law. 
This stands in contrast with the increasing recognition of  racial discrimination, espe-
cially in the educational domain, and gender violence as a form of  discrimination. 
We posit that this paradox is, inter alia, caused by an (unconscious) understanding of  
racial violence from a Holocaust perspective, which triggers a Gestalt shift and, with it, 
the debunking of  the discrimination paradigm by a criminal/genocidal paradigm. We 
find particular confirmation for this hypothesis in the forced sterilization cases against 
Roma women that have reached the ECtHR over the past years. We argue that this 
should be overcome if  the ECtHR is to give due visibility to the discriminatory dimen-
sion of  the violence that racial minorities experience today in Europe and that the 
Court already has the tools and the obligation to do so, primarily by consistently apply-
ing its anti-discrimination doctrine, as it has evolved in other domains, to the cases of  
racial violence.
90 V.C. v. Slovakia, supra note 71, paras 145, 151 (emphasis added).
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